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INTRODUCTION 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Air Products & 
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas Inc.1 presents a distinct turn in poison pill 
doctrine.  One important question before the Airgas court was how long 
a target company could maintain a poison pill as a defense against an 
unsolicited merger attempt.2  Previous Delaware state court 
jurisprudence established that the threat of uninformed shareholders 
tendering into an inadequate bid was a legitimate threat justifying the 
maintenance of a pill.3  Airgas presents a distinct turn from this line of 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 113. 
 3. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384–85 (Del. 
1995). 
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cases.  The court held that the threat of a large number of merger 
arbitrageurs tendering into an inadequate bid, thereby destroying 
shareholder wealth, justifies the maintenance of a pill.4  Through this 
decision, the Airgas court drew a distinction between short-term and 
long-term shareholder interests in takeovers, and relied on these 
shareholders’ disparate economic incentives as the crucial factor 
permitting maintenance of a pill. 
This Note reviews the Airgas court’s analysis and considers 
whether Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors5 have sufficiently 
dissimilar preferences and incentives in takeovers to justify different 
treatment for Unocal purposes.6  Part I describes the Airgas decision.  
Part II examines Hedge Funds’ general investment strategies and how 
they affect takeovers.  Next, Part III considers Institutional Investors’ 
general investment strategies and how they affect takeovers.  Part IV 
compares and contrasts the broader economic interests of Hedge Funds 
and Institutions and finds limited evidence of similarity.  Part V 
discusses the impact of these findings on previous analysis by legal 
scholars and courts about what takeovers should be allowed.  Finally, 
this Note concludes by discussing other considerations affecting 
takeover jurisprudence. 
I. AIRGAS, ARBITRAGEURS, AND UNOCAL 
Part I introduces the Unocal standard governing enhanced judicial 
scrutiny for defensive measures in takeovers.  Next, it examines the 
Airgas court’s application of that standard.  Finally, this part explores 
the Airgas court’s reservations about its conclusion. 
A. THE UNOCAL STANDARD 
As a defensive measure against a hostile bid, the maintenance of a 
poison pill is evaluated under the familiar Unocal standard.7  To satisfy 
enhanced Unocal scrutiny of defensive measures, a target board must 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 111–13. 
 5. Throughout this Note, the term Institutional Investors will be used 
interchangeably with Institutions.  
 6. Parts II, III, and IV of this Note explore in depth how Hedge Funds are 
different from Institutional Investors, and vice versa, on the basis of the typical 
investment strategies of each type of investor and the economic preferences and 
incentives that result from such strategies.     
 7. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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show that: (1) “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to 
corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and (2) any response to that 
threat “[was] reasonable in relation.”8  “Directors satisfy the first part of 
the Unocal test by demonstrating good faith and reasonable 
investigation” in their determination that the bid constituted a threat.9  In 
addition to showing the reasonableness of their process, the board must 
also articulate a legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness.10  
Under the second part of the Unocal test, courts evaluate whether the 
board’s response to the threat was disproportionate, meaning 
“draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive.”11  If not, the court 
then determines whether the board’s actions fell “within a range of 
reasonable responses to the threat” posed.12 
B. AIRGAS 
In Airgas, the Airgas board faced a series of unsolicited all-cash, 
all-shares merger bids from Air Products and refused to redeem its 
poison pill for over a year.13  From the time Air Products first 
approached Airgas until the day this case was decided, Airgas shares 
ranged from $41.64 to $71.28.14  Even though the tender offers reached 
as high as $70 per share, Airgas’ majority-independent director board 
believed that the offers were inadequate.15  The board believed that the 
company was worth $78 per share, relying on three reports by 
independent financial advisors.16 
Applying the first prong of the Unocal test, the Airgas court 
identified the articulated threat as “inadequate price” and “the fact that a 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. Id. at 955. 
 9. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990). 
 10. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 301 n.8 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 11. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995).  A 
defensive measure is coercive if it is “aimed at ‘cramming down’ on its shareholders a 
management-sponsored alternative.” Id. at 1387 (citing Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. 
Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55(Del. 1990)).  A defensive measure is preclusive if it 
“makes a bidder’s ability to wage a successful proxy contest and gain control either 
‘mathematically impossible’ or ‘realistically unattainable.’” Carmody v. Toll Brothers, 
Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389). 
 12. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367. 
 13. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,16 A.3d 48, 55–56 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 14. Id. at 61. 
 15. Id. at 108. 
 16. Id. at 111. 
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majority of Airgas’s stock [was] held by merger arbitrageurs17 who 
might be willing to tender into such an inadequate offer.”18  Relying on 
the long-standing principle that a board may reasonably rely on 
independent financial advisors, the court first determined that the Airgas 
board had a good faith, reasonable belief that the final offer was 
inadequate.19  In light of “sufficient evidence that a majority of 
stockholders might be willing to tender their shares regardless of 
whether the price is adequate or not,”20 the court determined that the 
alleged threat was legitimate and that the first prong of the Unocal test 
was satisfied.21  The court found that the second prong of the Unocal test 
was satisfied as well.  The board’s actions were not “draconian” because 
Air Products could run another proxy contest to replace the Airgas 
board.22  The board’s response was within a range of reasonableness 
because it “[did] not forever preclude Air Products” from running a 
proxy contest23 and permitted the company to continue being run 
successfully according to the status quo.24 
In evaluating the board’s perceived threat that shareholders may 
tender into an inadequate offer, the Airgas court (somewhat 
inconsistently) used the term “merger arbitrageur” to classify investors 
perceived to have short-term economic incentives.25  At the time 
litigation commenced, this type of shareholder constituted half of the 
company’s shareholder base.26  The court’s classification yields two key 
characteristics of short-term-driven investors.  First, these investors’ 
economic incentives27 are driven by their use of merger arbitrage and 
event-driven investment strategies.28  Second, Hedge Funds represent a 
substantial portion of the investors utilizing these strategies.29 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
 18. Id. at 105. 
 19. See id. at 110. 
 20. Id. at 111. 
 21. Id. at 111–12. 
 22. Id. at 120–22. 
 23. Id. at 124. 
 24. Id. at 124–25. 
 25. See id. at 109–112. 
 26. Id. at 109 (“[A] large percentage (almost half) of Airgas’s stockholders are 
merger arbitrageurs.”). 
 27. See id. at 118 (noting Airgas’s expert witness’ chart identifying 46% of 
outstanding shares as held by “arbitrageurs and event-driven investors”). 
 28. See generally infra Part II.C. (explaining these strategies). 
 29. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 109 n. 413. 
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The Airgas court went on to explain the rationale for classifying 
shareholders based on their economic incentives.  Since many of these 
shareholders purchased Airgas stock “at [the bid’s commencement or, at 
least at] a time when the stock was trading much lower than it is today . . 
. they stand to make a significant return on their investment even if the 
[tender] offer grossly undervalues Airgas.”30  Relying on the evidence in 
the record, particularly each party’s expert witnesses on shareholder 
voting, the court noted that there was adequate evidence to find that “a 
large number—if not all—of the arbitrageurs . . . would be happy to 
tender their shares, [if profitable], regardless of the potential long-term 
value of the company.”31  Thus, the court concluded, “the risk” of a 
large number of short-term-driven shareholders tendering into an 
inadequate offer at the expense of long-term shareholders’ interests 
constitutes a legitimate threat for Unocal purposes.32 
C. THE CONTROVERSY 
Writing the opinion, Chancellor William B. Chandler expressed 
frustration with the result but considered the court to be constrained by 
Delaware precedent.33  Reviewing the development of Unocal 
jurisprudence, Chandler traced the idea that shareholders might tender 
into an inadequate offer back to concerns that shareholders were not 
sufficiently informed by the company’s board.34  But, he continued, 
“[o]nce the stockholders have access to [adequate] information, the 
potential for stockholder ‘confusion’ seems substantially lessened.”35  
                                                                                                                                         
 30. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 109. 
 31. Id. at 111. 
 32. Id. at 111–12 (“This is a clear ‘risk’ under the teachings of TW Services and 
Paramount because it would essentially thrust Airgas into Revlon mode.”) 
 33. See generally id. at 57–58 (briefly describing reservations about the decision). 
 34. See generally id. at 93–94 (reviewing the development of Unocal 
jurisprudence). 
 35. Id. at 100; id. at 57 (“Airgas’s stockholder base is sophisticated and well-
informed, and . . . essentially all the information they would need to make an informed 
decision is available to them.  In short, there seems to be no threat here—the 
stockholders know what they need to know (about both the offer and the Airgas board’s 
opinion of the offer) to make an informed decision.”); id. at 100 (“If the stockholders 
are presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed 
competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for 
deliberation has been afforded them?”) (quoting Chesapeake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 
328 (Del. Ch. 2000)). 
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Chandler continued on to note that Airgas’ shareholders were 
sophisticated, well-informed, and had access to “essentially all the 
information” they would need to make an informed decision.36  Thus, in 
his view, but for Unocal and its progeny, Airgas’ stockholders would be 
permitted to vote.37  Indeed, “directors of a corporation still owe 
fiduciary duties to all stockholders—this undoubtedly includes short-
term as well as long-term holders.”38   
Binding Delaware precedent, however, focuses judicial scrutiny of 
a company board’s actions on whether a company is affirmatively 
selling itself—meaning Revlon applies39—or maintaining the status 
quo—meaning Unocal applies—instead of considering whether 
shareholders are adequately informed.40  Here, merger negotiations had 
reached an apparent “end stage” and the Airgas board continued to resist 
Air Products’ merger overtures.41  Ultimately, Delaware precedent 
provides that “a board cannot be forced into Revlon mode any time a 
hostile bidder makes a tender offer that is at a premium.”42  Thus, 
Chandler reluctantly concluded that Unocal was satisfied in this case 
and the pill could be maintained.43 
II. WHAT ARE THE PREFERENCES AND INCENTIVES OF HEDGE FUNDS? 
Part II will provide a basis to explain Hedge Funds’ incentives and 
preferences.  Section A will provide a background of Hedge Funds.  
Section B will develop the common investment strategies used by 
Hedge Funds.  Section C will identify merger arbitrage and event-driven 
activism as the two strategies most applicable to takeovers and describe 
how they work.  This section will also identify common conflicts of 
interest posed by Hedge Funds, particularly in relation to derivative use. 
                                                                                                                                         
 36. Id. at 100–01. 
 37. Id. at 101. 
 38. Id. at 129. 
 39. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986), the Delaware Supreme Court held that, when a Delaware corporation puts itself 
up for sale, its directors have an affirmative duty to seek the best price for its 
shareholders. 
 40. Airgas, 16 A.3d  at 103 (“Thus, it seemed . . . that so long as a corporation is 
not for sale, it is not in Revlon mode and is free to pursue its long run goals.  In essence, 
. . . a well-informed board acting in good faith in response to a reasonably perceived 
threat may, in fact, be able to ‘just say no’ to a hostile tender offer.”). 
 41. Id. at 100–01. 
 42. Id. at 129. 
 43. Id. 
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A. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND? 
Hedge Funds “are actively managed investments that pool 
investors’ capital in order to acquire, own, and trade one or more of 
securities, commodities, and financial products.”44  According to Hedge 
Fund Research Inc., global assets under management reached $2.19 
trillion as of the end of the third quarter of 2012.45  In comparison to 
other investment vehicles, Hedge Funds face few regulatory 
restrictions.46  Investments are premised on managers’ skill in generating 
a risk-adjusted return, or “alpha.”47  Managers are typically compensated 
in two forms: management fees equal to 1 to 2% of assets under 
management48 and performance fees equaling 20% of investment returns 
that exceed a certain “hurdle” rate.49  When losses deplete investors’ 
initial capital contributions, managers are generally precluded from 
receiving performance-based compensation until that capital is restored 
and the specified rate has been exceeded.50  Investors are usually not 
contractually permitted to sell or redeem their shares for a specified 
amount of time called a “lock-up” period51 without incurring redemption 
fees.52 
                                                                                                                                         
 44. Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 323, 324 (2007). 
 45. Hedge Fund Assets Surge to Record in Third Quarter, HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, 
INC., 1 (2012), https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20121018.pdf. 
 46. See generally Lydie N.C. Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public 
Good, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 46–55 (2009) (discussing the limited scope 
of hedge fund regulation). 
 47. See id., at 43. 
 48. This is calculated based on the Net Asset Value and equals the Fund’s Assets 
less Liabilities, or Equity. See STUART A. MCCRARY, HOW TO CREATE & MANAGE A 
HEDGE FUND 14 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) (2008). 
 49. Id. at 14–15.  For example, a typical Hedge Fund subscription agreement for $1 
million might entitle a Hedge Fund manager to 1.5% of the assets under management 
and 20% of any returns in excess of the 6% hurdle rate. 
 50. Id. at 15. 
 51. “Lock-up periods can range from six months to five years.  Lock-up period 
restrictions apply to investors’ ability to transfer or sell their interest in a hedge fund.” 
Pierre-Louis, supra note 46, at 44. 
 52. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 14. 
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B. COMMON HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES 
“Hedge funds generally employ an absolute return approach to 
investing through which they seek to profit in a variety of market 
environments.”53  In order to preserve strategic flexibility, many—but 
not all—Hedge Funds use multiple strategies.54  Since Hedge Funds 
“invest across diverse asset classes and types of securities,” their 
investment portfolios feature a broad range of investment horizons and 
risk characteristics.55  This section is not meant to provide a complete 
picture of how Hedge Funds make investment decisions—nor could it 
possibly do so.  Instead, the discussion sheds light on strategic features 
affecting their decision-making.56   
Long and short equity is the most common strategy employed by 
Hedge Funds and involves taking long and short positions in various 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 33 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
 54. This feature serves two purposes.  First, by diversifying the securities held by 
the fund, systemic risk is mitigated. See William Fung & David A. Hsieh, The Risk in 
Hedge Fund Strategies: Theory and Evidence from Trend Followers, 14 REV. FIN. 
STUDIES 313, 314 (2001).  Second, funds allocated to a particular strategy can be re-
allocated to a different strategy—in which the fund specializes—in response to market 
opportunities. See, e.g., Gregory Connor & Teo Lasarte, An Overview of Hedge Fund 
Strategies 2, http://www.atrader.com/files/upl/pdf/nid/An-Overview-of-Hedge-Fund-
Strategies.pdf. 
 55. STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 49, at 33. 
 56. “Hedge Fund Research (HFR), one of the main hedge fund databases, lists 30 
separate strategies (with some overlap between them). Another widely used database, 
TASS Research, separates hedge funds into 17 strategy types.” Connor & Lasarte, 
supra note 54, at 3.  Two other hedge fund databases—Van Hedge and CISDM—
provide coverage of all hedge funds with Van Hedge offering “generic performance 
information on hedge fund styles.” Hany A. Shawky & Achla Marathe, Stylistic 
Differences Across Hedge Funds as Revealed by Historical Monthly Returns, 2 TECH. 
& INV. 26, 27 (2010) [hereinafter Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences].  
Traditional risk management tools have been used to describe Hedge Fund strategies by 
asset class, direction, type, liquidity and geographical region. See generally Richard 
Bookstaber, Hedge Fund Existential, 59 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 20 (2003) (describing 
various organizational approaches).  Empirical approaches have also attempted to 
classify Hedge Fund strategies based on returns. See generally William Fung & David 
A. Hsieh, Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading Strategies: The Case of Hedge 
Funds, 10 REV. FIN. STUDIES 275, 275–302 (1997) (identifying five distinct strategies); 
Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences, supra (focusing on monthly returns and 
identifying four distinct strategies and, within two of those categories, eight sub-
strategies). 
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equity securities.57  A security purchaser is long when he or she stands to 
benefit from any increases in the security’s value.  A security purchaser 
is short when he or she stands to benefit from any decreases in the 
security’s value.58  Long and short portfolios are sometimes highly 
concentrated in specific sectors or even companies.59  Long and short 
positions may also offset one another, resulting in net long positions or 
net short positions.  This strategy can be used alongside the market-
neutral techniques described below.60 
Since many investment strategies generate concentrated risk 
attributes, Hedge Funds employ quantitative-based market-neutral 
strategies to mitigate systemic risk.61  These strategies are often based on 
certain trading rules such as an opinion that a certain sector is more 
valuable than another, and feature little manager discretion.62  Leverage 
is also commonly applied to market-neutral investing because the 
absolute amount of profit per trade can be small.63 
Hedge fund managers also commonly use relative value 
strategies.64  These strategies have been described as “picking up nickels 
in front of bulldozers.”65  They are designed to take advantage of 
perceived mispricing among related financial assets and are often based 
on “the long-run tendency of market prices to revert to equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                         
 57. Jerald David August & Lawrence Cohen, Hedge Funds – Structure, Regulation 
and Tax Implications, in THE PARTNERSHIP TAX PRACTICE SERIES: PLANNING FOR 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES 2009, at 715, 722 (PLI Course Handbook, May-Jun. 2009).  
 58. Opening a short position involves borrowing and selling a security with the 
intent to purchase it back later for a lower price and return it to the borrower.  A short-
seller thus bears the risk that the security will increase in value. See id. 
 59. See, e.g., MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 34 (Funds “can have substantial 
exposure to specific sectors and even individual companies.”). 
 60. “A long/short position is created across different investment sectors or within a 
particular sector, based on quantitative models designed to dampen broad equity 
swings.” August & Cohen, supra note 57, at 722. 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 722. 
 62. See, e.g., MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36. 
 63. See, e.g., Jongho Kim, Can Risks Be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? 
Lessons from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 
6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 29, 73 (2007). 
 64. FILIPPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 15 (John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc.) (2006) (50% of hedge funds employ relative value strategies, including 
merger arbitrage). 
 65. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 102 (Random House) (2000). 
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relationships.”66  The simplest example of a relative value trade involves 
identifying a price divergence between two historically related stocks 
and being short the historically over-valued stock and long the 
historically under-valued stock.  Typically, Hedge Funds will use 
derivatives to offset their “exposure to the price movements of the 
underlying securities, interest rates, and broad market movements.”67  
Since the pricing discrepancy is usually small, this strategy is also often 
highly leveraged.68  Relative value strategies can include convertible 
arbitrage,69 fixed income arbitrage,70 and pricing inefficiencies71 in 
bonds, government securities, or a company’s debt and equity.72   
Other common Hedge Fund strategies are also widely used.  
Macroeconomic strategies make large, leveraged bets on “major 
macroeconomic events such as changes in interest rates, currency 
movements and stock market performance.”73  The strategy is not 
market-neutral and “relies on the ability to make superior forecasts” and 
decisive execution.74  Similarly, emerging market strategies incorporate 
many of the above-discussed strategies, with a focus on developing 
countries.75  Managed future strategies focus on “equity index futures, 
fixed income futures, options on individual equities and commodity 
                                                                                                                                         
 66. Connor & Lasarte, supra note 54, at 8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. A convertible arbitrage strategy seeks to profit from an undervaluation in the 
market of a bond or preferred stock that is convertible to equity.  Investors “typically 
take a long position in the convertible bond and short the company’s equity.  In doing 
so, the investor takes advantage of the undervaluation of the convertible bond while 
reducing the exposure to the underlying stock price movement.” See generally id. at 8–
9. 
 70. “[P]rofits are attained by exploiting pricing inefficiencies between related fixed 
income securities, while exposure to interest rate risk is neutralized….” August & 
Cohen, supra note 57, at 722. 
 71. “[I]nvestment decisions are based on quantitative models for statistical 
arbitrage . . . .” Id. 
 72. Connor & Lasarte, supra note 54, at 10–11. 
 73. Id. at 7; Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences, supra note 56, at 27. 
 74. Connor & Lasarte, supra note 54, at 7. 
 75. “This strategy involves equity or fixed income investing in emerging markets 
around the world.  Because many emerging markets do not allow short-selling, nor 
offer viable futures or other derivative products with which to hedge, emerging market 
investing often employs a long-only strategy.” Mila Getmansky et al., Shifting Through 
the Wreckage: Lessons from Recent Hedge Fund Liquidations, in THE WORLD OF 
HEDGE FUNDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND ANALYSIS 7, 41 (H. Gifford Fong, ed., World 
Sci. Publ’g Co. Pte. Ltd. 2005). 
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futures.”76  Fund of funds strategies assume Hedge Funds are a unique 
asset class and invest across managers and strategies in order to mitigate 
non-systemic market risk and benefit from diversification.77 
C. TAKEOVER STRATEGIES: ACTIVISM AND MERGER ARBITRAGE 
Event-driven strategies seek special corporate opportunities and 
rely largely on fundamental analysis to make investment decisions.78  
Two particular types of event-driven strategies—activism and merger 
arbitrage—play a major role in attempted takeovers.  Section C.1 
describes how activism works and how it affects takeovers.  Section C.2 
explains how merger arbitrage works and how it affects takeovers. 
1. Activism 
Activist Hedge Funds typically use fundamental analysis79 to 
identify favorable investments.80  Approximately $50 billion—or 5% of 
global assets81—is committed to activist strategies.  Activist strategies 
can further be divided into corporate governance and takeover strategies, 
the two not necessarily being mutually exclusive.82  Corporate 
                                                                                                                                         
 76. Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences, supra note 56, at 33. 
 77. Na Dai & Hany A. Shawky, Diversification Strategies and the Performance of 
Funds of Hedge Funds, 1 (Working Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719749. 
 78. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 37. 
 79. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1383 (2007) (“[These funds] maintain concentrated portfolios and often avoid the 
hedged or multi-strategy approaches followed by other funds, with their managers 
tending to be former investment bankers or research analysts rather than quantitative 
experts.  They do the research and know their targets well . . . .”). 
 80. See generally Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future 
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds 9–11 (U. Cambridge Faculty L. Research 
Paper No. 38/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1932805 (describing Hedge Fund decision-making). 
 81. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1046 n.135 (2007) (citing 2006 J.P. 
Morgan report); Paul R. Kingsley, Hedge Fund Activism and Its Impact on Corporate 
Boards, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2007: COUNSELING YOUR CLIENT FOR THE 2007 
PROXY SEASON at 15, 17 (PLI Course Handbook, Jan. 17, 2007) (identifying “at least” 
$50b devoted to activist strategies as of 2007). 
 82. See generally Charles M. Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of 
Institutional Investors and Institutional Voting, (Working Paper, 2010), available at 
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governance activism generally focuses on “advisory vote[s] on 
executive pay (‘say-on-pay’ proposals), majority voting in director 
elections, the right to call special meetings and independent board 
chairmanship . . . proposals for board declassification and poison pill 
redemption.”83  Takeover activism generally focuses on cash returns 
through “leverage, big dividends, recapitalizations, sales, and similar 
transactions that return capital immediately to shareholders.”84   
Overall, activism typically involves acquiring relatively small 
stakes85 in under-valued companies86 and “propos[ing] strategic, 
operational, and financial remedies.”87  Activist targets are often 
relatively small.88  Hedge Funds leverage their relatively small 
ownership stakes in several ways.  Funds may “target . . . several 
companies on similar issues,”89 form alliances with influential 
shareholders—like Institutional Investors,90—or cooperate with 
                                                                                                                                         
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1583507 (describing Hedge Fund 
Activism within a Corporate Governance-Takeover framework). 
 83. Theodore N. Mirvis, Takeover Law and Practice 2010, in DELAWARE LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 2011: WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW, at 413, 434 
(PLI Course Handbook, May 18, 2011). 
 84. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful 
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 n.20 (2010). 
 85. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1732 (2008) (“The median maximum ownership stake for 
the entire sample is about 9.1%.  Even at the 95th percentile in the full sample, the stake 
is 31.5%-far short of the level for majority control.”). 
 86. See id. at 1730 (Hedge Funds often seek stakes in companies with two key 
features: low ratios of market value to book value (total cash value of company equity 
over balance sheet value of company equity based on assets less liabilities) and “sound 
operating cash flows and return on assets.”). 
 87. Id. at 1729; see also Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New 
Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, J. CORP. L. 681, 695 (2007) (defining 
hedge fund activism as “any actual or overtly threatened proxy contest or any other 
concerted and direct attempt to change the fundamental strategic direction of any 
solvent United States public corporation other than a mutual fund. . . .  For example, 
any campaign using such phrases as value ‘“maximization’” or ‘“enhancement’. . . .”). 
 88. Bratton, supra note 79, at 1388. 
 89. See Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1733. 
 90. See id.; Strine, supra note 84, at 8 n.20 (“The ‘governance activists’ often 
amplify the power of the hedge funds by pushing corporate governance measures – 
such as the elimination of classified boards and other takeover defenses – that make 
boards more susceptible to immediate market pressures” (referencing William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 653, 684 (2010) (“The hedge funds have inspired interventions by large, 
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management.91  Activists are often successful92 and, despite a reputation 
for management hostility, openly oppose management less than thirty 
percent of the time.”93   
Takeover activism in target stock holdings typically results in 
increased shareholder wealth.94  However, gains attributed to this 
strategy can depend on merger consummation.95  When mergers are not 
consummated, this strategy produces below-average returns.96  As a 
result, takeover activists with target stock holdings are incentivized to 
favor merger consummation and can affect merger outcomes in several 
ways.  Hedge Funds with significant target stakes agitate for higher 
quality consideration and initiate value-producing litigation.97  Hedge 
Funds also launch takeover bids for those companies in which they are 
invested—as principal investors or as part of investment syndicates—
and have also attempted to leverage their holdings to put the company 
into play.98  Hedge Funds with significant acquirer stakes engage in 
                                                                                                                                         
mainstream investment advisors; they also have depended on and received the support 
of other, more passive institutional investors.”))). 
 91. See Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1733. 
 92. See Bratton, supra note 79, at 1405–06 (finding empirical eighty percent 
success in hostile takeovers); Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1732 (estimating two-thirds 
empirical success rate in hostile takeovers). 
 93. Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1732. 
 94. See Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge Funds as Shareholder 
Activists from 1994-2005, 1, 1–4, 20 (July 31, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=992739 (presenting results indicating that aggressive activism, 
focusing on obtaining a significant share of the target’s stock, obtaining board control, 
and obtaining a variety of securities from the target, among other factors, “significantly 
improves short-term and long-term performance of target firms compared to non-
targets” but that “passive activism” does not produce abnormal returns); Brav et al., 
supra note 85, at 1731 (finding abnormal returns for activism resulting in changes in 
business strategy takeovers, but not for governance-related activism); Robin 
Greenwood & Michael Schor, When (Not) to Listen to Activist Investors, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan. 2008, http://hbr.org/2008/01/when-not-to-listen-to-activist-investors/ar/1 
(finding strong returns when a takeover occurs, but not otherwise); Jiekun Huang, 
Hedge Funds and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Leveraged Buyouts 24-25 (May 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086687 (finding large Hedge Funds holdings is 
associated with higher leveraged buyout premia). 
 95. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 94. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1034–39 (describing Hedge 
Fund strategies in mergers). 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 1040–42. 
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activism as well.  However, where takeover activists with large target 
stock holdings prefer mergers to be consummated, takeover activists 
with large acquirer holdings have the opposite incentives and thus often 
oppose mergers99 to avoid merger-related stock declines.100 
While mainstream shareholders sometimes benefit from takeover 
activist strategies, their economic interests can sometimes conflict.101  
When Hedge Funds with significant short target positions oppose 
mergers through media campaigns102 or litigation,103 their managers’ 
motivations are limited to their economic incentives.  Hedge Funds may 
prefer a merger alternative featuring greater consideration while 
management prefers a synergy-creating union.104  Hedge Fund managers 
might also favor merger outcomes that optimize105 their holdings in 
merger party securities, like common shares, preferred shares, debt and 
options.106 
The use of derivatives can also leverage a Hedge Fund’s merger 
influence and exacerbate shareholder conflicts.107  In at least two 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1034–39 (discussing Hedge 
Funds’ incentives in mergers). 
 100. See infra note 136. See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in 
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 623–28 (1989) (discussing irrational overpayment by 
bidders in takeovers). 
 101. See generally infra Part IV (discussing whether the economic incentives of 
Hedge Funds and Institutions are aligned in the takeover context). 
 102. In the case of In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 670 (Del. 
Ch. 2004), a Hedge Fund attempted to prevent consummation of a merger when it stood 
to profit from its short position in a specific type of convertible debt security if the 
merger failed.  In order to protect its interest, the hedge fund published a newspaper 
advertisement urging rejection of the transaction, convinced a proxy advisory firm not 
to recommend the merger and started a website encouraging target shareholders to seek 
appraisal rights. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1073. 
 103. In the case of High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487 
(M.D. Pa. 2005), a Hedge Fund initiated litigation designed to prevent merger 
consummation when it stood to profit from its short position if the merger failed. 
 104. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 582–83 (2006). 
 105. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1289 (2008). 
 106. See Hu & Black, infra note 107, at 835 (describing decoupling strategy of 
hedge funds, like using borrowed shares to profit from put options); see also Peter 
Lattman, Fortress Clashes on Both Sides, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at C1 (discussing 
conflicts of interest when private equity firms, like Fortress, have both debt and equity 
in the same firm). 
 107. See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
775, 789–94 (2005) (describing seven situations where shareholders use derivatives to 
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instances, Hedge Funds entered into complex derivative transactions to 
enhance their voting power without incurring additional economic risk.  
In High River Ltd. Partnership v. Mylan Labs,108 a Hedge Fund with a 
large target position arranged for two banks to borrow ten percent of the 
acquirer’s shares and sell short to the hedge fund the shares to vote in 
the merger.109  The Fund and the banks also entered into a total return 
swap on the same number of Mylan shares.110  The swap required the 
fund to pay the banks any increases in share value, thereby offsetting the 
banks’ short position in the acquirer, and for the banks to pay any 
decreases in share value to the fund, thereby offsetting the Hedge Fund’s 
long position in the acquirer.111  Thus, the Hedge Fund held no 
economic interest in the acquirer by virtue of the swap and, if the merger 
were consummated, the Hedge Fund would gain on its substantial pre-
swap target holding when the target increased to the merger price.112  
Similarly, in CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Investment Fund (UK) 
LLP,113 a Hedge Fund began building a significant position in CSX by 
entering into cash-settled total return swaps with several different 
banks.114  The Hedge Fund sought to increase its interest in CSX to gain 
                                                                                                                                         
vary their short-term and long-term economic interests while retaining voting power); 
see generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S.CAL L. REV. 811 (2006) (discussing the 
negative consequences resulting from shareholders acquiring voting rights with limited 
economic risk). 
 108. 353 F. Supp. 2d 487 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 109.  Charles M. Nathan, Merger Arbitrage, Beneficial Ownership Reporting and 
Proxy Contests: The SEC’s Perry Order, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 4 (Oct. 25, 2009), 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2854_1.pdf. 
 110. See id.  A swap agreement in which one party makes payments based on a set 
rate, either fixed or variable, while the other party makes payments based on the return 
of an underlying asset. See Financial Derivative Terms, FINCAD, 
http://www.fincad.com/derivatives-resources/glossary/total-return-swap.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 111. See Nathan, supra note 109, at 4. 
 112. The merger was not consummated for unrelated reasons.  See Nathan, supra 
note 109, at 5.  The SEC indicated that the Hedge Fund should have disclosed its 
ownership position, but found no other securities laws violations. See id at 5–6, 9. 
 113. 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d 
Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 114. Total Return Swaps can either be cash-settled or settled-in-kind.  A cash-settled 
swap is terminated when the Hedge Fund receives the cash equivalent of any 
appreciation and cash distributions (interest or dividends) generated by the underlying 
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board seats through a proxy contest,115  and ultimately direct CSX’s 
business strategy in accordance with its own economic interests.  In fact, 
the fund at one point even contemplated the possibility of an LBO.116  
The Hedge Fund accumulated approximately fourteen percent of the 
voting power in CSX through a combination of derivative and physical 
holdings.117  Initially, the Hedge Fund did not cause its physical 
holdings, nor the physical holdings of any of its counterparties to exceed 
five percent of CSX, which would have triggered mandatory disclosure 
under the Williams Act.118  Eventually however, the Hedge Fund 
consolidated its derivative holdings into two counterparties, in part 
because they believed these banks would be more willing to vote the 
shares according to the Hedge Fund’s wishes.119  The Hedge Fund did 
not disclose its physical and derivative holdings to the SEC until 
officially coordinating with another Hedge Fund to act as a group for 
securities law purposes.120  At that time, the Hedge Fund disclosed both 
its physical and derivative holdings.  A suit was brought by CSX against 
the Hedge Fund alleging, inter alia, that the disclosure of beneficial 
ownership was not timely filed.121  The District Court, relying on fact-
specific analysis and without expressly deciding whether total return 
swaps necessarily constitute beneficial ownership for Williams Act 
purposes, held that the Hedge Fund did not file its disclosure in a timely 
fashion because the total return swaps in this instance constituted a 
violation of the anti-evasion provisions of the Williams Act.122 
                                                                                                                                         
security. See id. at 520.  A settled-in-kind swap is terminated identically, except the 
Hedge Fund purchases the security in exchange for its price at a pre-determined, pre-
sale reference date (i.e., the fifteenth day of the preceding month). Id. 
 115. See id. at 526. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 528–29. 
 119. Id. at 529–30. 
 120. Id. at 535–36. 
 121. Id. at 538. 
 122. Id. at 545–48. 
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2. Merger Arbitrage 
What is Merger Arbitrage? 
Merger arbitrage funds “seek to profit from trades involving change 
of corporate governance.”123  In a typical merger, the putative acquirer 
makes a tender offer or merger proposal to purchase the target 
company’s shares for a significant premium.  Once the merger is 
announced, shares of the target usually increase and shares of the 
acquirer usually decrease.124  Target stock will generally continue to 
trade at a discount to merger consideration125 because of the risk that the 
merger will not be completed.126  This is the arbitrage opportunity.127 
Merger Arbitrageurs 
Once the merger is announced, traders and Hedge Funds known as 
“merger arbitrageurs” begin acquiring stakes in the merger parties,128 
and trading steadily increases until the merger is either consummated or 
fails.129  Arbitrageurs make money in two ways: pre-merger sales of 
appreciated merger party securities and post-merger sales of merger 
consideration.130  Even though arbitrageurs invest a relatively small 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36. 
 124. See Stanley Block, Merger Arbitrage Hedge Funds, 16 J. APPLIED FIN. 88, 89 
(2006) (citing 5-15% premia post-merger announcement for cash mergers). 
 125. Mark Mitchell et al., Price Pressure around Mergers, 59 J. FIN. 31, 35 (2004). 
 126. Empirical studies have identified certain material risks associated with merger 
arbitrage: “target’s stock price run-up, termination fees, ownership in target’s shares by 
bidding firm, target resistance, arbitrage spread, relative target size, transaction size, 
bidding competition, deal consideration structure, and bid premium.” Jia Wang & Ben 
Branch, Takeover Success Prediction and Performance of Risk Arbitrage, 15 J. BUS. & 
ECON. STUDIES 1, 1 (2009).  Other factors affecting non-consummation include 
rejection by shareholders, antitrust concerns, and the deteriorating financial condition of 
either merger party or the economy. Block, supra note 124, at 89. 
 127. See Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk 
Arbitrage, 56 J. FIN. 2135, 2138 (2001) (finding 4% risk arbitrage returns for mergers 
between 1963 and 1998 after adjusting for transaction costs). 
 128. Keith M. Moore et al., The Behavior of Risk Arbitrageurs in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 9 J. ALT. INV. 19, 26 (2006). 
 129. Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers, 15 REV. FIN. 
STUDIES 837, 837 (2002). 
 130. See MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36, 37 (“The success of a particular [merger 
arbitrage] trade hinges almost entirely on whether the announced deal is completed.”); 
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amount of their portfolios in any single transaction,131 as a group they 
often number between thirty and forty percent of all stockholders during 
the period after the merger is announced.132 
Arbitrageurs are relatively risk-averse133 and generally support 
mergers.134  While it is possible to profit by betting against a merger 
succeeding,135 the unexpected failure of a few transactions can 
completely eliminate annual profits of merger arbitrageurs betting in 
favor of merger consummation.136  Mergers are consummated nearly 
ninety percent of the time137 and arbitrageurs determine whether or not 
                                                                                                                                         
see also Cornelli & Li, supra note 129, at 838; Jim Hsieh & Ralph A. Walkling, 
Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions 6 (Tuck 
Contemporary Corp. Fin. Issues III Conference Paper; Dice Ctr. Working Paper No. 
2003-14, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=571022 (“Unlike small shareholders or noise traders, arbitrageurs tend to accumulate 
blocks of target shares after an acquisition announcement and sell their shares to the 
bidder at resolution of the offer.”); Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 35 (“[I]f the 
merger fails, the target firm’s stock price usually falls dramatically, generating a large 
negative return.  Merger arbitrageurs are compensated for bearing this transaction 
risk.”). 
 131. See Moore et al., supra note 128, at 26 (noting that arbitrageurs generally limit 
the size of their trades to approximately ten percent of a mean $150 million portfolio). 
 132. Cornelli & Li, supra note 129, at 838; Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 34 
(citing forty per-cent acquirer short interest in fixed stock consideration mergers). 
 133. See Defendants’ Post-Supplemental Hearing Memorandum at 16, Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (2010) (5249-CC, 5256-CC), 2011 WL 396487, 
at *16 (Arbitrageurs “are more likely to be risk averse than risk loving (although risk 
tolerance will also vary depending upon the size of the firm, investment strategies, 
etc.)” (citing ISS report)). 
 134. See, e.g., id. (Arbitrageurs’ “willingness to ‘leave some money on the table in 
exchange for an earlier and more certain pay out’ . . . ‘can make [them] a hostile 
acquirer’s best ally.’”) (citing ISS report). 
 135. See Dion Friedland, About Hedge Funds – Reducing Market Risk with Merger 
Arbitrage, MAGNUM FUNDS, available at http://www.magnum.com/hedgefunds/ 
reducingmarketrisk.asp (“Others, anticipating failed deals, short the target’s stock.  For 
example, Paulson Partners shorted the stock of AEL Industries Inc., a supplier of 
electronic systems and subsystems, after acquisition plans by another company were 
reported to be on shaky ground.”); see also infra note 143 (providing merger arbitrage 
calculation). 
 136. Ben Branch & Taewon Yang, A Test of Risk Arbitrage Profitability, 15 INT’L 
REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 39 (2006) (finding that the failure of six of one hundred merger 
attempts in 2002 resulted in a 5.7 percent loss). 
 137. Block, supra note 124, at 89 (“[T]he median probability of successful 
consummation of all mergers is 89%.  However, the success rate is slightly higher for 
flexible stock for stock exchanges (93%), and slightly lower for cash and fixed stock for 
stock exchanges (87 and 88%, respectively).”). 
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to support a merger based on its offer characteristics and other factors 
affecting consummation.138  Arbitrageurs exhibit skill in identifying 
high-likelihood mergers:139 mergers with greater arbitrageur holdings are 
more likely to be consummated140 and arbitrageurs avoid offers unlikely 
to result in a merger, such as those with especially high takeover 
premia.141  Arbitrageurs also exhibit skill in affecting merger outcomes: 
increased holdings are associated with greater likelihood of 
consummation, increased bid premia, and higher arbitrage returns.142 
 Merger arbitrage is conducted through various strategies of 
differing complexity and the choice of strategy depends, in part, on the 
consideration offered in the merger.  This section discusses merger 
arbitrate strategies associated with mergers involving (i) cash 
consideration, (ii) fixed stock consideration, (iii) floating stock 
consideration, and (iv) stock consideration with collars. 
Merger Option 1: Cash Consideration 
Cash mergers present the simplest arbitrage opportunity.  The 
expected return on a cash transaction is the probability that the merger 
will be consummated multiplied by the difference between the merger 
consideration and the stock purchase price, plus the probability that the 
merger will not be consummated multiplied by the difference between 
the stock purchase price and the stock price prior to the merger 
announcement.143   
                                                                                                                                         
 138. See id. (“[A] friendly negotiated offer is 20.48 times more likely to succeed 
than a hostile tender offer.”).  See generally supra note 126 (describing merger 
consummation risks). 
 139. See Hsieh & Walkling, supra note 130, at 5–6 (discussing evidence of 
arbitrageurs “anticipat[ing] deal success rates”). 
 140. See id.; Neiliane Williams, Arbitrageur Activity and Market Anticipation in 
Predicting Takeover Success 9 (Mar. 2009) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Concordia 
University) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations and Theses) (finding evidence that 
post-merger announcement stock price run-up correlates with merger success). 
 141. Ben S. Branch & Jia Wang, Risk-Arbitrage Spreads and Performance of Risk 
Arbitrage, 11 J. ALT. INV. 9 (2008). 
 142. See Hsieh & Walkling, supra note 130, at 36 (discussing evidence that merger 
arbitrageurs “exert active influence in the takeover market”). 
 143. This formula can be expressed in terms of annual returns as:  
[C *G – L * (100 – C)]/[Y * P] where C is the probability of merger consummation, G 
is the positive return of the merger consideration less the security purchase price, L is 
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Merger Option 2: Fixed Stock Consideration 
When merger consideration is in a fixed ratio of stock instead of 
cash, analyzing the expected transaction value and determining an 
appropriate arbitrage strategy is more complicated.144  Say Company A 
offers Company T 0.5 shares of Company A stock worth $80 for every 
share of Company T stock worth $35 on the day of announcement.145  
Company T shareholders should be concerned that Company A stock 
will decline and decrease the aggregate transaction value.  In order to 
lock in merger consummation gains, a Company T stockholder will 
short146 0.5 shares of Company A stock for every Company T stock 
share that is held.147  “A similar merger arbitrage position as described 
above can also be constructed with options.  Instead of short selling 
[Company A] shares, an investor can sell call options and buy put 
options with the same maturity date and exercise price.”148  In order to 
hedge against the possibility that the merger will not be consummated 
and that the investor has an unprotected short position in Company A, 
                                                                                                                                         
the negative return of the security purchase price less the pre-merger-announcement 
security price, Y is the holding period and P is the security purchase price. 
 144. Empirical accounts of arbitrageur trading patterns match predictions about how 
this basic trade operates.  Thus, in a fixed stock consideration merger, median short 
interest in acquiring firms is forty percent.  See Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 34 
(confirming the prediction that arbitrageurs will purchase sizeable short stakes in the 
acquirer to hedge against merger non-consummation). 
 145. See id. at 33 (commenting that most stock mergers involve fixed consideration 
ratios and describing the mechanics of the trade). 
 146. “Preparation for a short sale begins with a request that the arbitrageur’s broker 
find a lender for the shares that are to be sold.  The universe for potential lenders 
include the broker itself if it has an inventory of the desired stock, or institutional 
investors, including pension funds, insurance companies, and index funds . . . . The 
arbitrageur transfers collateral to the lender in the amount of 102% of the value of the 
borrowed securities, typically in cash.  The lender then pays interest to the arbitrageur 
on the cash collateral, termed the rebate rate, and has the right to call the loan at any 
time.” Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 728 (2003). 
 147. Consider that Company T shareholders expect a $5 return on each $35 share 
that is being exchanged for one-half Company T share.  Selling short the one-half 
Company A share for $40 provides the shareholder with $40 cash and the obligation to 
turn over one-half Company A share on the date of merger.  If Company A’s half-share 
declines to $35, the Company T shareholder still has a $5 return. 
 148. Arco Wagemakers, BofA/Countrywide Merger Arbitrage Opportunity, SEEKING 
ALPHA, http://seekingalpha.com/article/66797-bofa-countrywide-merger-arbitrage-
opportunity. 
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the Company T stockholder should buy a call option149 or sell a put 
option150 on Company A stock.151 
Merger Option 3: Floating Stock Consideration 
A variation of the fixed ratio stock merger is the floating ratio stock 
merger.  Here, Company A proposes an all-stock merger with Company 
T for a fixed value of Company A shares.  The value in Company A 
shares is determined by Company A’s average price during a designated 
pricing period.152  For the arbitrageur, the transaction is the same as a 
cash merger before the pricing period–because the consideration is 
fixed—and the same as a fixed ratio merger post-pricing period—
because the consideration is now variable.153  Thus, the arbitrageur will 
adopt the above-described strategies for each period: purchasing target 
stock pre-pricing period and acquiring short positions post-pricing 
period.154  Arbitrageurs have particular difficulty pricing this trade due 
to information constraints and value fluctuations.155 
                                                                                                                                         
 149. A call option is the right to purchase a security for a fixed price (the strike 
price) on a fixed date plus the price of exercising the option.  For example, the right to 
purchase one share of Company A stock for $75 on the date of merger with a $1 
exercise price is a call option. 
 150. A put option is the right to sell a security for a fixed price (the strike price) on a 
fixed date plus the price of exercising the option.  For example, the right to sell one 
share of Company A stock for $75 on the date of merger and a $1 exercise price is a put 
option. 
 151. Buying a call option on the Company A stock enables the Company T to cover 
its short position for the option exercise price plus the strike price (and the initial option 
price).   Exercising the option will be less expensive than purchasing the security in the 
market when the market price exceeds the strike price plus the option exercise price.  
Selling a put option on the Company A stock allows the Company T stockholder to 
receive the initial option price.  The option holder will only exercise the option if the 
security’s market price is less than the strike price plus the exercise price. 
 152. Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 36. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 33 (describing arbitrageur difficulties pricing floating stock merger trades 
with limited information); see also Block, supra note 124, at 91 (discussing 2001 
merger of two insurance companies featuring floating stock consideration and collars). 
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Merger Option 4: Stock Consideration with Collars 
Variations of stock consideration mergers may further increase the 
complexity of the arbitrage trade.156  Some mergers involve “collars,” 
which define the applicable range of consideration to be used in the 
merger.157  A fixed stock consideration “collar” sets the minimum and 
maximum value of acquirer shares to be used in the transaction.158  For 
example, Company A proposes a merger with Company T where 1 share 
of Company A stock, currently worth $10, will be exchanged for 2 
shares of Company T stock, currently worth $4.50 each.  A “collar” 
provision is negotiated guaranteeing that, regardless of price changes, 
the consideration, in Company A shares, for each Company T share will 
be no less than $9 and no more than $11.  A “collar” provision could 
instead be negotiated guaranteeing that, regardless of price changes, the 
consideration, in Company A shares, for each Company T share, will be 
no less than 0.9 shares and no more than 1.1 shares.159 
III. WHAT ARE THE PREFERENCES AND INCENTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS? 
Part III will provide a basis to explain Institutional Investors’ 
incentives and preferences. Section A provides a background of the 
Institutional Investors landscape.  Section B develops their economic 
interests by analyzing their investment characteristics and investing 
approaches.  Section C discusses Institutional Investor responses to 
anticipated takeovers. 
A. WHAT IS AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR? 
Mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and foundations 
make up the universe of Institutional Investors.160  It should be noted 
                                                                                                                                         
 156. See generally Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 37–38 (describing stock merger 
consideration variations). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 37. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen Davis, Are Institutional Investors Part of the 
Problem or Part of the Solution?, in NINTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 55, 61 (PLI Course Handbook, Sept. 7, 2011) (“At the 
end of 2009, there were more than 700,000 pension funds, 8,600 mutual funds, 7,900 
insurance companies in the US alone.”). 
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that retail investors161 will not be discussed in this Note because they 
have little effect on corporate events162 and are, in large part, the 
beneficiaries of mutual funds and pension funds.163  Mutual funds alone 
constitute the “largest shareholder category in U.S. public markets,”164 
and the industry is dominated by a small number of large funds.165  
There are three major types of pension funds: public pension funds 
organized for the benefit of state and local government employees, 
which are often advised by political officials; labor-union pension funds 
organized for the benefit of union members;166 and private pension funds 
organized for the benefit of private-sector employees.  In the aggregate, 
Institutions own more than half of the shares in the stock market.167 
Institutional fund manager compensation bears some similarities to 
Hedge Fund manager compensation.  Both forms of compensation 
typically include management fees and performance incentives,168 but 
Institutional managers’ performance-based compensation is limited by 
direct regulation and indirect pressure.  Mutual fund managers are 
                                                                                                                                         
 161. Retail Investors are “individuals with small stakes in a particular firm.” See Lee 
Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections, 2010 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 104 (2010). 
 162. Id. at 104 (“[T]he evidence suggests that contested corporate elections are 
virtually off-limits as a conduit for [retail investor] activism.  Retail investors almost 
never launch a campaign and their interests are not represented well by those who do.”). 
 163. Id. at 131 fn.83 (describing retail investors as pension fund and mutual fund 
beneficiaries). 
 164. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 12 
(52nd ed. 2012). 
 165. The largest twenty five firms managed seventy three percent of mutual fund 
assets in 2011, and the largest ten firms managed fifty three percent. Id. at 25. 
 166. A more detailed overview of public and labor-union pension funds appears in 
Anabtawi, supra note 108, at 588–89. 
 167. Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights around 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 J. 
CORP. FIN. 129, 129 (2009).  See generally JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, 
THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE 
CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 3 (U. Penn. Press) (2000) (characterizing 
Institutional Investors as “universal owners” with exposure to the entire economy). 
 168. See Gilchrist Sparks, III & John P. DiTomo, The Short-Term Vs. Long-Term 
Dilemma, in NINTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 125, 
130 (PLI Course Handbook, Sept. 7, 2011) (Performance-based compensation for 
pension fund, mutual fund and endowment fund investment managers “often include[s] 
hurdle rates and exponential performance incentives.”); accord supra notes 49–50 and 
accompanying text (describing Hedge Fund compensation arrangements). 
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directly regulated: they are permitted to receive management fees169 and 
limited performance-based compensation,170 but are barred from 
receiving capital-gain-based compensation.171  Public pension fund 
managers are indirectly regulated: political pressure may limit 
government officials from authorizing generous compensation 
packages.172 
B. COMMON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STRATEGIES 
Institutions employ a broad range of investment strategies.173  A 
minority of Institutional Investors even invests in Hedge Funds.174  
Notwithstanding those allocations, Institutions generally favor 
diversified portfolios of liquid assets and typically avoid sophisticated 
investment techniques. 
                                                                                                                                         
 169. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 12. 
 170. Id. (“Although mutual funds can collect performance-based incentive fees, 
most do not, and the incentive fees are almost always smaller than the smallest hedge 
fund incentive fees.”). 
 171. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-b-5(a)(1) (2006) (“No 
investment adviser . . . [shall be compensated] on the basis of a share of capital gains 
upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of the client.”).  
Registered Investment Companies–which include most mutual funds–are required to 
hire Registered Investment Advisors. 15 U.S.C. § 80-b-3(b)(3). 
 172. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1057–59. 
 173. See Arik Ben Dor et al., Understanding Mutual Fund And Hedge Fund Styles 
Using Return-Based Style Analysis, in THE WORLD OF HEDGE FUNDS: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND ANALYSIS 63, 64 (H. Gifford Fong ed., World Sci. Publ’g Co. 
Pte. Ltd. 2005) (“For example, Morningstar, a prominent source of information on 
mutual funds, reports returns on four broad categories (domestic stock funds, 
international stock funds, fixed-income funds, and municipal bond funds) which are 
further divided into 48 sub-categories.  The Investment Company Institute enumerates 
33 investment objective categories.”). 
 174. “80% of public pension funds, and 82% of corporate funds, have little or no 
investment in hedge funds.” See Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (July 25, 2006) 
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm.  The remaining public 
pension funds allocate an average of 5.1%.  Id.  About two-thirds of foundations invest 
in Hedge Funds, with an average allocation of 18%. See Barbara T. Dreyfuss, What 
Hedge Funds Risk, AM. PROSPECT, (June 17, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/what-
hedge-funds-risk; Hedge Fund Sources of Capital, THE HENNESSEE GROUP, 
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/information/info/SourcesofCapital 2005.pdf (Hedge 
Fund capital, as of 2005, is composed 14% from corporations, 7% from pension funds, 
and 7% from charitable foundations and endowments.). 
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1. Investment Characteristics  
Most Institutions are required by state or federal law to invest in 
highly liquid assets and maintain well-diversified portfolios.175  Mutual 
funds advertised as “diversified” face significant regulatory 
requirements.176  State-regulated public pension funds and insurance 
companies are often required to keep a stated percentage of their 
investment portfolios in liquid, publicly-traded securities.177  Federally 
regulated private pension funds also “continue to place the bulk of their 
investments in public securities markets.”178  By contrast, less-regulated 
private foundations typically invest more capital in illiquid securities.179  
Institutional liquidity preferences and investment horizons also vary 
according to their beneficiaries’ needs.  Retail-investor-focused mutual 
fund managers prefer liquid, short-term investments180 because they face 
daily withdrawals.181  Insurance companies and pension funds have 
longer investment horizons because benefits will be paid further in the 
future.182  Some mutual funds address liquidity and diversification 
                                                                                                                                         
 175. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 105, at 1278–79. 
 176. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1049 (describing legal rules requiring 
many mutual funds to diversify). 
 177. Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital 
Markets, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 247 (2009).  But see Marcel Kahan & 
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1057–59, 1057 n.179 (2007) (noting that public pension funds, 
while subject to a prudent investor standard, are not statutorily required to diversify but 
may face political pressures requiring it). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (“[T]hose [funds] that are more willing to embrace investment 
experimentation (endowment funds) have shown a willingness to increase their 
allocation to private securities markets.”). 
 180. François Derrien et al., Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies 2 (Oct. 20, 
2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.efmaefm.org/ 
0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA ANNUAL MEETINGS/2010-Aarhus/EFMA2010_0159_ 
fullpaper.pdf; Jose-Miguel Gaspara et al., Shareholder Investment Horizons and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 136 (2005); see also Anabtawi, 
supra note 104, at 579 (noting that mutual funds turnover their shares about once a 
year, one-third as often as Hedge Funds). 
 181. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 11. 
 182. Derrien et al., supra note 180, at 1–2; Gaspara et al., supra note 180, at 136.  
But see Heineman & Davis, supra note 160, at 67 (discussing long-term investment 
constraints for pension funds, life insurance companies and foundations, but noting 
inapplicability of this analysis to mutual funds). 
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restrictions by allocating funds to low-cost, passive investment 
strategies.183  These so-called index funds are designed to produce the 
returns of all the stocks on an index like the S&P 500 while minimizing 
transaction costs (i.e. trades) for beneficiaries.184 
2. Investment Approaches 
Institutional Investors tend to avoid many of the investment 
techniques favored by Hedge Funds.185  Indeed, they rarely invest 
borrowed funds186 and are often contractually prohibited from short-
selling.187  While Institutions typically offset portfolio risks with simple 
hedging derivatives,188 many are not permitted to use more sophisticated 
                                                                                                                                         
 183. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 105, at 1276. But see Sparks & DiTomo, supra 
note 168, at 130 (“Mutual funds and other asset managers often forego long-term 
strategies through churning portfolios to attract new investments for the next quarter.”). 
 184. See Anabtawi, supra note 104, at 579 n.82. 
 185. Compare supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text with supra notes 53–56, 
60–77 and accompanying text. 
 186. Mutual funds do not usually use leverage and it “almost never exceeds 2:1.” 
MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 11.  Insurance companies employ minimal leverage and 
most defined-contribution and corporate pension funds do not use leverage at all. 
Nikola Spatafora, Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial 
Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risks, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 2009: 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, 319, 388 (PLI Course Handbook, Aug. 5, 2009). 
 187. See, e.g., Andres Almazan et al., Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager?, 
73 J. FIN. ECON. 289, 295 (2004) (reporting two-thirds of mutual fund management 
contracts restrict short sales); see also Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-12(a)(1)-(3) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company . . 
. to purchase any security on margin . . . or to effect a short sale of any security. . . .”). 
 188. “A mutual fund may invest in derivatives for a variety of reasons, including for 
‘hedging’ (i.e., risk reduction) purposes and as a substitute for investment in 
‘traditional’ securities.” Alison M. Fuller, Derivatives, in INVESTMENT COMPANY 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE, 181, 183–84 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 21–22, 
2011).  But see SEC Seeks Public Comment on Use of Derivatives by Mutual Funds and 
Other Investment Companies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/news/press/ 
2011/2011-175.htm.  Mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds are large 
derivative buyers. Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout 
Bankruptcies, The Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 
2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 185 (2011).  Pension funds engage in swaps to offset 
their interest rate and inflation risk. Jonathon Keath Hance, Note, Derivatives at 
Bankruptcy: Lifesaving Knowledge for the Small Firm, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 711, 
726 (2008). 
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derivatives.189  Despite these restrictions, Institutions represent roughly 
one quarter of total end-users of credit derivatives.190 
3. Strategies 
Institutional activism is principally motivated by preserving 
shareholder wealth191 and typically focuses on governance reforms.192  
While individual Institutions exhibit unique preferences for certain 
governance features,193 they rarely mount electoral challenges.194  
Institutions also can support Hedge Funds’ governance initiatives,195 
                                                                                                                                         
 189. Pension Funds are typically barred from investing in index derivatives like 
futures and options. W. Thomas Connor, The Evolving Nature of Exchange-Traded 
Product Regulation, in FUNDAMENTALS OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE-TRADED 
FUNDS 2011, 189, 197 (PLI Course Handbook, June 8, 2011).  Mutual Funds are 
permitted to purchase these derivatives. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 12. 
 190. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-07-716, CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES: CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISKS, 
BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION 6 n.8 
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf (“The top five end-
users of credit derivatives are banks and broker-dealers (44 percent), hedge funds (32 
percent), insurers (17 percent), pension funds (4 percent), and mutual funds (3 
percent).”) 
 191. See generally Cheffins & Armour, supra note 80, at 7–8 (describing 
Institutional Investor decision-making). 
 192. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 105, at 1276 (“A number of prominent 
Institutional Investors–including both mutual funds like Fidelity and Vanguard and 
pension funds like CalPERS–have emerged as activist investors willing to mount public 
relations campaigns, initiate ligation, and launch proxy battles to pressure corporate 
officers and directors into following their preferred business strategy.”); Strine, supra 
note 84, at 8 n.20 (2010) (“Unlike activist investors in the hedge fund sense, corporate 
governance activists primarily agitate only about corporate governance.”); Randall S. 
Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 310 (2008) (citing Institutional Investor 
activism in securities suits, Rule 14a-8 proposals and public pension fund attempts to 
influence management). 
 193. See generally Joseph McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors at 20 (Tilburg L. Sch., Research 
Paper No. 010/2010, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1571046 (comparing and contrasting the governance preferences of Hedge 
Funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds). 
 194. Harris, supra note 161, at 129 (noting that the vast majority of electoral 
challenges come from “private firms,” notably Hedge Funds). 
 195. Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1748; Daniel A. Neff, Takeover Law and 
Practice: 2008 13, in FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND 
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presumably believing their economic interests to be aligned.196  Overall, 
there is mixed evidence that institutional activism generates long-term 
value.197  However, pension funds exhibit skill in spurring governance 
reforms.198 
Institutional investment decisions are also affected by extrinsic 
economic factors.  Thus, demonstrating support for company 
management could require opposing a value-generating initiative 
because management opposes it.199  Similarly, advancing common 
political causes could involve exerting pressure on company 
management.200 
                                                                                                                                         
RELATED ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 317, 336 (Sept. 2008) (“In 2007, 
institutions and hedge funds launched campaigns against approximately 40 
transactions.”).  The recent reduction in companies with poison pill defenses is 
considered a result of Institutional Investor-Hedge Fund cooperation. Id. at 15 (citing 
decline of S&P 500 companies with poison pills from 46% in 2005 to 28% in 2008). 
 196. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1091–92; see also Andrea Zanoni, Hedge 
Funds’ Empty Voting in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Fiduciary Duties Perspective, 9 
GLOBAL JURIST, Nov. 2009, at 15, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285589 
(inferring that investors perceive hedge fund intervention as adding economic value). 
 197. Compare Thomas, supra note 192, at 310 n.21 (citing surveys showing little 
positive effect) with Claire E. Crutchley et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS’ 
Activism, 7 FIN. SERVS. REV. 1 (1998) (finding that visible and aggressive institutional 
activism leads to substantial increases in shareholder wealth); Michael P. Smith, 
Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227 
(1996) (finding increased shareholder wealth for issuers that responded to targeting by 
CalPERS). 
 198. David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance 24–25 
(N.Y.U. Stern Sch. Bus. Working Paper Series, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1523562 (reviewing empirical studies of pension funds’ monitoring ability). 
 199. Mutual funds and pension fund managers sometimes vote with company 
management and against value-generating resolutions due to perceived or actual 
pressure from management. See George W. Dent, The Essential Unity of Shareholders 
and the Myth of Shareholder Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 119 n.89 (2010) 
(citing empirical studies and anecdotal evidence).  Banks and insurance companies have 
also been identified as ex ante likely to favor management. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1277, 1318 (1991).  This effect also appears in mergers with low levels of 
shareholder support when investment managers may be voting to maintain business 
relationships or based on bullish investment opinions on the merged company, or on a 
desire to appear activist. See Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 130. 
 200. See Anabtawi, supra note 104, at 590 (discussing pressure by CalPERS, a 
public pension fund, on a company to accept union demands and end the strike of a 
powerful private union). 
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Proxy advisory firms also affect an Institution’s decision-making.201  
These firms publish corporate initiative voting guidelines from the 
hypothetical perspective of a one to two year holding period 
stockholder.202  ISS, the leading firm,203 “exercises a great deal of 
influence over the vote of many of its clients and . . . these clients often 
hold an important part of the available vote.”204  Among Institutional 
Investors, mutual funds are particularly deferential to advisory 
recommendations.205 
                                                                                                                                         
 201. Institutional Shareholder Services, PROXY Governance, Inc., Glass, Lewis & 
Company and Egan-Jones Proxy are the leading proxy advisory firms. See Stephen J. 
Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 
650 (2009). 
 202. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2011 U.S. PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES SUMMARY (describing voting recommendations as based on a one to two 
year holder), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicy 
SummaryGuidelines20110127.pdf. 
 203. “[Institutional Shareholder Services] claims over 1,700 institutional clients 
managing $26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 
25 asset managers and 17 of the top 25 public pension funds.” Robert Daines et al., 
Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? 1 (Rock Ctr. for 
Corp. Governance Stan. Univ.Working Paper 1, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152093. 
 204. See Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 357-58 (Del. 
Ch. 2010), aff’d 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011); Choi et al., supra note 201, at 657 ([ISS] is 
“able to sway up to 30 percent of the vote in any particular proxy contest.”); Paul H. 
Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Resetting the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Selectica’s 
Unanticipated Consequences 36 (Vand. Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 
10-16, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1631941 (“Voting 
recommendations by ISS are viewed as influential, if not determinative, in proxy 
contests . . . .  Institutional investors overwhelming use the services of ISS and the other 
third party voting advisors, and empirical research has shown that ISS’s 
recommendations have an impact on the outcome in shareholder voting contests.”).  
Legal scholars have criticized this trend. See generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy 
Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for Increased Oversight and 
Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009); Choi et al., supra note 201, at 649. 
 205. See James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on 
Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (“[M]utual funds voted consistently with ISS 
voting recommendations more than all shareholders.  Given that we cannot break out 
the mutual funds’ actual votes from the total vote captured in the all shareholder vote, 
this effect is likely to be even larger than what we are measuring with the currently 
available data.”); Ying Duan, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior 12, 18 (Mar. 7, 
2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College) (explaining that Mutual Funds 
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C. TAKEOVER STRATEGIES  
 
Institutions protect portfolio wealth by monitoring company 
management before a takeover bid is attempted.  Public pension funds 
exhibit particularly strong monitoring abilities.206  In contrast, mutual 
funds are often ineffective long-term value monitors and generally favor 
merger bids.207  Overall, longer pre-bid holding periods by Institutions 
tend to enhance shareholder wealth, whether a takeover is consummated 
or not.208  Institutions also maximize economic wealth by influencing 
takeover outcomes.209  Once a takeover bid is announced, Institutions 
typically acquire voting rights in the merger parties’ securities.210  
Institutions usually retain these shares post-vote211 and are particularly 
                                                                                                                                         
are more likely to vote against managers than to sell when ISS recommends 
management opposition), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101809. 
 206. Lily Xiaoli Qiu, Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from 
Acquisition Activity 2–3 (Brown Econ. Working Paper Series No. 2004-21, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=521803 (suggesting 
increased public pension fund monitoring ability results from larger holdings). 
 207. Id. at 3–4 (discussing mutual funds’ poor monitoring ability). 
 208. Target companies with shorter holding periods by Institutions are more likely 
to be acquired and typically receive lower premia. Gaspara et al., supra note 180, at 137 
–38.  The authors believe that shorter holding periods by Institutions diminish company 
monitoring and weaken the company’s bargaining position. Id.  Consequently, they 
argue, target shareholders capture a reduced portion of the economic surplus available 
in the merger bid. Id. 
 209. Jarrad Harford et al., Conflicts of Interests among Shareholders: The Case of 
Corporate Acquisitions 25 (Mass. Inst. Tech., Sloan Research Paper No. 4653-07, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=947596 (finding evidence that cross-owners 
may disagree about whether the transaction should proceed and hypothesizing that 
portfolio optimization is the underlying rationale); see also Anabtawi, supra note 104, 
at 585 (hypothesizing Institutional Investor opposition to the Oracle/PeopleSoft merger 
if the merger negatively affected the Investor’s stakes in other PeopleSoft-using 
companies). 
 210. For example, Institutional Investors may purchase discounted acquirer shares 
post-merger-announcement in order to vote for the merger and gain on their target 
holdings.  They also may use those shares to vote against the merger and avoid a post-
merger acquirer share price decline.   See generally Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 
130; Kai Chen, Institutional Behavior of Trading Acquirer Stocks around Mergers and 
Acquisitions, in Essays on Corporate Control Transactions 42, 60 (May 11, 2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) (on file with 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses) (describing the behavior of Institutions post-merger 
announcement). 
 211. Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 130. 
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active in purchasing voting rights when they are cheaply available.212  
Since diversified Institutions generally “cross-own” both target and 
acquirer shares,213 they usually determine whether or not to support a 
merger based on the aggregate economic effects on portfolio wealth.214  
Thus, an Institution hoping to manage a target company’s pension funds 
may purchase acquirer shares to vote against a merger.215 
IV. HEDGE FUNDS AND INSTITUTIONS LACK SIMILAR ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS 
Part IV demonstrates that Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors 
lack similar preferences and incentives in takeovers.  Section A begins 
by discussing the claim that Hedge Funds’ takeover activities benefit all 
shareholders, including retail investors, Institutional Investors, holders 
of beneficial interests in Institutional Investors, or any other holder of 
stock, and finds mixed evidence of this assertion.  Sections B through D 
discuss circumstances in which the interests of Hedge Funds and 
Institutional Investors can diverge.  Section B describes shareholder risk 
tolerances and finds little risk tolerance overlap.  Section C describes 
these shareholders’ investment horizons and finds limited investment 
horizon overlap.  Section D analyzes investment managers’ 
compensation incentives and finds that these explain much of the 
overlap and dissimilarity between the economic incentives of Hedge 
Funds and Institutional Investors.  Section E considers intra-
shareholders conflicts of interest and finds that both Hedge Funds and 
Institutions sometimes oppose the interests of other shareholders, 
notably retail investors, holders of beneficial interests in Institutional 
Investors, and any other holder of stock. 
                                                                                                                                         
 212. Id. at 130–31 (discussing increased purchasing by Institutions in low-
probability mergers). 
 213. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-ownership, Returns and 
Voting in Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 392 (2008). 
 214. See Chen, supra note 210, at 60; Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 213, at 402–
03 (finding for non-value-generating mergers, cross-owner acquirer shareholders were 
much more likely to vote in favor of the merger than acquirer-only shareholders). 
 215. Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 131. 
2012] FULL OF HOT AIR? 155 
A. THE VALUE PROPOSITION 
There is mixed evidence that Hedge Funds’ takeover strategies 
benefit all shareholders.  Merger arbitrage can benefit all shareholders 
under limited circumstances.  Increased merger arbitrage activity 
enhances takeover premia and improves the likelihood of merger 
consummation.216  Thus, when a takeover is the only possible outcome, 
increased expected takeover premia necessarily benefits all 
stockholders.  Of course, takeover bids are not always successful.  
Moreover, the takeover premia received by the target shareholder in a 
merger is not necessarily preferable to potential gains from rejecting a 
merger bid and continuing as a stand-alone company.  While merger 
arbitrage strategies generate value for merger arbitrageurs, it is not clear 
that all shareholders benefit.217 
In addition, takeover activism only enhances shareholder wealth 
when takeovers result.218  Overall, the strategy generates value219 and 
enjoys support by Institutions.220  But the strategy is not always value-
creating: unconsummated mergers generate below-average returns.221  
Thus, the strategy distorts economic outcomes: successful takeovers are 
value-creating and unsuccessful takeovers are value-destroying.  
Moreover, while the strategy may on average increase shareholder 
returns, such added returns may not adequately compensate shareholders 
for the increased risk of takeover failures. Allocating shareholders’ 
increased expected value and greater return variance is not necessarily 
preferable to capturing any gains resulting from rejecting a merger bid 
and continuing as a stand-alone company.  While takeover activism 
generates shareholder value overall, it is not clear that shareholders 
aggregately benefit in light of the increased risks.222 
B. RISK TOLERANCE 
Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors exhibit dissimilar 
tolerances for risk in several ways.  While Hedge Funds make 
                                                                                                                                         
 216. See supra notes 94–95, 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 94. 
 220. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
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concentrated investments223 across the universe of asset classes,224 most 
Institutions are directly or indirectly required to invest in highly liquid, 
diversified portfolios.225  Their respective approaches to leverage, short-
selling, and derivatives are instructive as well.  While Hedge Funds 
liberally employ leverage226 and frequently short sell,227 Institutions 
largely avoid borrowing and may face short-selling restrictions.228  
Similarly, while Hedge Funds often enter into complex derivative 
transactions,229 derivative use by Institutions is typically limited to basic 
hedging.230  Hedge Funds also utilize activist strategies four times more 
often than Institutions.231  By contrast, Institutional activism is typically 
motivated by wealth preservation.232  Overall, Hedge Funds’ and 
Institutions’ respective investment characteristics exhibit dissimilar risk 
tolerance. 
C. INVESTMENT HORIZON 
While Hedge Funds and Institutions each exhibit short-term biases, 
Hedge Funds’ respective preference is more pronounced.  Trading data 
indicate that Hedge Funds purchase and sell securities far more often 
                                                                                                                                         
 223. See Harris, supra note 161, at 131 (“The high concentration of these funds 
makes them very dissimilar to the investment portfolio of the average shareholder, who 
owns a stake in a fully-diversified pension fund or mutual fund.”). 
 224. See MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 11 (“The range of assets within a particular 
mutual fund is much smaller than that of a hedge fund.”). 
 225. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 63, 68 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 105–22 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Hedge Fund Investor Activism and 
Takeovers 22 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Papers, Paper No. 08-004, 2007), available at 
http://hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-004.pdf.  Moreover, Institutional Investors do not lead 
the majority of challenges. See Harris, supra note 161, at 129 (“If public pension funds, 
mutual funds, or similar institutions, were launching the majority of challenges there 
might be good reason to believe that the interests of small retail investors were being 
served in those contests.  Such institutions are likely more responsive to the preferences 
of small shareholders, since they likely draw their capital directly from a diverse 
investor class.”). 
 232. See generally Cheffins & Armour, supra note 80, at 7–11 (comparing 
Institutional Investor and Hedge Fund decision-making). 
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than do average market participants,233 and three times more often than 
mutual funds.234  In contrast to a Hedge Fund portfolio’s broad 
investment spectrum,235 Institutional allocations exhibit far narrower 
liquidity preferences, which reflect their beneficiaries’ needs.236  Yet 
while trading data and liquidity preferences demonstrate that Institutions 
are less short-term oriented than Hedge Funds, Institutional short-term 
biases manifest in other ways.  Indeed, Institutions prefer short-term 
earnings increases over long-term value.237  Investment manager 
compensation incentives also encourage short-term biases for 
Institutions and Hedge Funds alike.238 
Hedge Funds’ takeover strategies also exhibit signs of short-term 
biases compared to Institutions.  Merger arbitrage presents a contrast in 
shareholder continuity.  While merger arbitrageurs liquidate their 
holdings as soon as possible,239 Institutions avoid liquidating voting 
rights purchased specifically to affect takeover outcomes.240  In addition, 
activist holding period data provides limited, conflicting evidence of 
Hedge Funds’ relative short-term biases.  While some studies find 
                                                                                                                                         
 233. NYSE Group Turnover, NYSE TECHNOLOGIES, www.nyxdata.com/factbook 
(choose Market Activity chapter hyperlink; then select NYSE Group Turnover 
hyperlink) (detailing one-year average annual turnover for NYSE-listed companies). 
 234. Anabtawi, supra note 104, at 579 (comparing 117% Mutual Fund turnover rate 
to Hedge Fund turnover rate). 
 235. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Brian Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over 
Long-Run Value?, (U. Pa. Working Paper Series, 1999) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=161739 (discussing Institutional 
short-term biases).  But see Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1085 (“[T]he empirical 
evidence on the extent and magnitude of [Institutional] myopia is sketchy at best.”). 
 238. Heineman & Davis, supra note 160, at 67 (citing the 2011 World Economic 
Forum report for support that “‘the goals and objective of the investment decision-
maker might not be aligned with those of the beneficiaries of the investment fund’ 
owing in part to skewed compensation schemes, risk measures that penalize managers 
who favor long-term investments, and career considerations.”). 
 239. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36 (“In some cases, the funds can unwind 
positions early if prices of the company shares reflect most of the profit potential.”); 
Moore et al., supra note 128, at 26 (noting that arbitrageurs sell their long positions 
when transactions are cancelled). Arbitrageurs limit the size of their trades to 
approximately ten percent of a mean $150 million portfolio. Id. 
 240. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
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evidence of comparatively short Hedge Fund holding periods,241 other 
studies indicate that activists maintain target stakes242 as long as other 
shareholders.243 
D. INVESTMENT MANAGER COMPENSATION 
The similarities and differences between Hedge Funds’ and 
Institutions’ investment horizons and risk tolerances can be explained by 
their investment manager compensation incentives and investment 
restrictions.  Common investment manager incentives likely account for 
both types of shareholders exhibiting short-term biases.244  Indeed, since 
each investment manager is compensated for achieving performance 
benchmarks,245 both should favor short-term increases that achieve those 
benchmarks.  However, short-term biases of Institutions are dampened 
by restrictions on investment manager compensation246 and liquidity, 
and by diversification requirements that limit managers’ investment 
allocations.247  Those requirements also instill in fund managers of 
Institutions with a relatively lower risk tolerance.248  In contrast, Hedge 
Fund managers’ risk preferences are incentivized by a compensation 
structure rewarding the highest investment returns,249 complemented by 
a flexible, sophisticated investment vehicle.250 
                                                                                                                                         
 241. Greenwood & Schor, supra note 231, at 13 (finding non-Hedge Fund 
shareholders have a twenty-one month median holding period compared to a four 
month Hedge Fund holding period). 
 242. Bratton, supra note 79, at 1412–13 (empirically finding that Activist Hedge 
Funds often hold stakes for one to two years); Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1731–32 
(finding evidence of twelve month holding period but considering the data incomplete 
and arguing that the actual holding period is closer to twenty or twenty-two months). 
 243. Compare supra note 241 with supra note 242. 
 244. See generally supra Part IV.C. 
 245. See supra notes 48–52, 168–72 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 175–90 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra Part IV.B. 
 249. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra Parts II.B.–C. (discussing Hedge Fund strategies); see also Brav et 
al., supra note 85, at 1773 (Hedge Fund managers “have very strong personal financial 
incentives [because they are mainly paid based on performance] . . .  and do not face the 
regulatory or political barriers that limit the effectiveness of [institutional investors].”). 
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E. INTRA-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICTS 
Both Hedge Funds and Institutions sometimes advance their 
economic interests at the possible expense of other shareholders’ wealth.  
Hedge Funds commonly oppose other shareholders’ interests when they 
engage in short-selling,251 use derivative contracts,252 or make 
investment-decisions based on a unique bundle of ownership interests.253  
Hedge Funds initiating litigation or media campaigns to protect short 
positions can also be at odds with other investors.254  Similarly, 
Institutions can negatively affect other shareholders by opposing 
corporate initiatives for Institution-specific business reasons,255 
pressuring company management to support an Institution-favored 
political agenda,256 or determining whether or not to vote for a merger 
based on optimizing their aggregate economic interests.257 
 
V. HOW DOES THIS ANALYSIS COMPLEMENT OR  
REBUT EXISTING TAKEOVER ANALYSIS? 
 
Part V considers how the dissimilar preferences and incentives of 
Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors both complement and rebut 
existing takeover analysis.  Section A compares the findings in Part IV 
to academic commentary that seeks to explain when mergers should be 
consummated.  Section B argues that, despite its reservations, the Airgas 
court’s protection of the poison pill was the optimal conclusion in light 
of existing evidence. 
A. THE ACADEMIC CASE FOR REFORM LACKS SUPPORT 
The preceding framework of dissimilar shareholder economic 
interests258 closely matches models offered by leading takeover 
jurisprudence scholars Martin Lipton259 and Lucian Bebchuk,260 as well 
                                                                                                                                         
 251. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 107–22 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 102–22 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra notes 209–15 and accompanying text. 
 258. See generally supra Part IV.B. 
 259. Martin Lipton is a Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz LLP. See Martin 
Lipton, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/Thread/ 
Attorneys/SubThread/Search/Name/Lipton, Martin. 
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as by behavioral finance theorists.261  These paradigms contradict262 
Frank Easterbrook’s263 corporate governance model of “homogenous” 
shareholders exhibiting preferences that are “likely to be similar if not 
identical.”264  Lipton conceives shareholders as a diverse body affected 
by different investment horizons,265 constituency obligations,266 and 
other investor-specific motives.267  Similarly, Bebchuk’s academic work 
discusses shareholders’ incongruent holding periods268 and pursuit of 
special interests.269 
                                                                                                                                         
 260. Lucian Arye Bebchuk is a Professor at Harvard Law School. See Professor 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Faculty/ 
bebchuk/. 
 261. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers 
and Acquisitions, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 65 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets 
Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, And Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 611 (1995). 
 262. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the 
Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 462–64 (2005) (discussing and rejecting the 
assumption of shareholder homogeneity); see also supra Parts IV.B.-D. 
 263. Frank Easterbrook is Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer in Law at The University of Chicago Law School. 
Frank Easterbrook—Biography, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/easterbrook. 
 264. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 405 (1983). 
 265. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 
VA. L. REV. 733, 746 (2007) (“[C]ertain vocal shareholders, notably hedge funds and 
arbitrageurs, invest over much shorter time horizons . . . and they accordingly favor a 
short-term spike in the share price over long-term wealth creation.”). 
 266. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the 
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 68 (2003) 
(“[S]hareholders are a diverse and ever-shifting group of people and institutions, with 
differing interests and, in the case of institutional investors, differing obligations to their 
own diverse constituencies.”); see also Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) 
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 468–72 (1991) 
(discussing institutional investor conflicts of interest). 
 267. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 266, at 78–79 (“Shareholders with ‘social 
causes’ regularly use governance as a mean to promote those causes.”); cf. Anabtawi, 
supra note 104, at 577–93 (discussing divergent shareholder interests). 
 268. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 675, 723–24 (2007) (addressing the risks associated with shareholders’ short-term 
biases). 
 269. Id. at 720–22 (discussing the effect of shareholders’ pursuit of special 
interests). 
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Yet even Lipton and Bebchuck disagree about how shareholder 
wealth is affected by disparate shareholder interests.  Lipton contends 
that self-interested shareholders encourage companies to prefer short-
term earnings increases to long-term value creation.270  Bebchuk offers a 
different view.  He does not dispute the risk of short-term shareholders 
negatively influencing companies and incentivizing directors to prefer 
short-term earnings increases,271 but contends that differences between 
shareholders’ economic interests do not cause negative wealth effects, 
and that a company’s adoption of shareholder-preferred measures is 
value-enhancing.272  Moreover, he argues that the greatest risk to 
shareholder wealth is not short-term-biased shareholders’ influence on 
management, but the risk that inadequately monitored directors will fail 
to effectively pursue long-term wealth creation.273 
Ultimately, Bebchuk and Lipton disagree about how the law should 
treat hostile takeovers in order to optimize shareholder wealth.  Lipton 
favors the current regime.  Since courts essentially defer to boards that 
reject hostile bids, directors are largely insulated from shareholder 
influence.274  But in Bebchuk’s view, the choice should belong to 
shareholders because “[they] have the best incentives.”275  Indeed, 
Bebchuk argues that companies defeating premium tender offers fail to 
                                                                                                                                         
 270. See Lipton & Savitt, supra note 265, at 733 (“[T]ransfer[ing] the basic 
responsibility of corporate management from directors to shareholders . . . would leave 
management and directors subservient to [their] whims . . . no matter how . . . self-
serving . . . parochial . . . inconsistent with long-term corporate performance, and . . . 
destructive to the economy as a whole.”). 
 271. See Bebchuk, supra note 268, at 723 (“The strongest objection to election 
reform comes from concerns about short-termism. The fear of being replaced, it might 
be argued, could lead boards seeking to please shareholders to take actions that improve 
short-term results but are not optimal from a long-term perspective.”); accord Lipton & 
Savitt, supra note 265. 
 272. See Bebchuk, supra note 268, at 721 (“The only resolutions that systematically 
obtain majority support are those calling for changes that are viewed as value-
enhancing by a wide range of financial institutions – such as destaggering the board or 
rescinding poison pills.  In contrast, proposals that focus on social or special-interest 
issues uniformly fall far short of a majority.”). 
 273. See id. at 724 (“Thus, the short-termism concern might justify providing boards 
with periods of significant length during which they do not face a meaningful chance of 
ouster. . . . While short-term insulation might induce directors to focus on long-term 
performance, indefinite insulation would enable boards to deviate from focusing on 
shareholder interests in both the short run and the long run.”). 
 274. See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 262. 
 275. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate 
Transactions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 1004 (2002). 
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produce worthwhile long-term returns.276  Thus, he favors weakening 
takeover defenses and expanding shareholder power in two ways: 
governance reforms incentivizing directors to advance shareholder 
interests277 and limiting directors’ takeover obligations to providing 
shareholders adequate information to make an informed decision.278 
However, there is reason to doubt Bebchuk’s claim that 
shareholders would be better off if they were permitted to vote in favor 
of hostile takeover bids.  At first, shareholders may benefit.  A more 
takeover-friendly legal regime presumably increases takeover attempts 
and successes.  Relaxing takeover restrictions also should, at first, 
increase the likelihood that activist strategies result in takeovers.  Even 
though activists typically hold small interests in target companies,279 
constraining board influence should improve takeover prospects despite 
activists’ low voting power.  Perceiving greater certainty in takeover 
consummation, merger arbitrageurs should contribute to this effect by 
investing in takeovers in greater numbers.280  Activism could also 
become a greater determinant in other shareholders’ returns because of 
its higher incidences of success.  While there is only mixed evidence 
that activism benefits shareholders generally281—and it increases return 
                                                                                                                                         
 276. Lucian Bebchuk, Op-Ed., An Antidote for the Corporate Poison Pill, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 24, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044766045761582 
11261083194.html (“[T]he empirical evidence indicates that when directors use their 
power to block offers, it often proves detrimental to shareholder interests. . . . [B]oards 
that defeated premium offers failed on average, even in the long run, to produce returns 
for their shareholders that made remaining independent worthwhile.”); see also Bernard 
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for 
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 551 (“Defeat of a hostile bid is, on average, bad 
for the target’s shareholders . . . . [If] targets that remain independent have hidden value 
on their own, there is no evidence of this over the two or three year period that the 
available studies cover.”). 
 277.  Bebchuk, supra note 268, at 729 (“[P]reventing incumbents from blocking 
hostile offers” and “facilitat[ing] removal of directors by shareholders via the ballot 
box” are complementary policies that “reinforce each other and both operate to make 
boards more accountable and more attentive to shareholder interests.”); see also Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 
409 (2005) (concluding that “staggered boards are associated with an economically 
meaningful reduction in firm value”). 
 278. See Bebchuk, supra note 275, at 1001–02. 
 279. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra Part IV.A. 
2012] FULL OF HOT AIR? 163 
volatility282—activist strategies resulting in takeovers positively affect 
shareholder wealth.283  Thus, increasing the likelihood of takeover 
successes should have initial positive effects on shareholder wealth. 
However, Hedge Funds employ a multitude of strategies and are 
generally sufficiently flexible to be able to allocate funds into emerging 
opportunities.284  Because of this feature, any increased activist strategy 
returns could simply attract new capital into the strategy in search of 
increased expected return, bringing about a new risk and return 
equilibrium that ultimately lowers expected returns.  The ultimate 
consequences for shareholders’ economic interests cannot be precisely 
quantified beyond these broad strokes.  And it cannot be said with any 
certainty, as Bebchuk contends, that weakening takeover defenses will 
generate positive aggregate shareholder wealth effects given the 
uncertain relationship between shareholders’ economic interests.285 
There is also reason to heed Lipton’s warning that empowering 
shareholders will distort economic returns and destroy long-term 
value.286  A more relaxed takeover regime may exacerbate existing intra-
shareholder conflicts among all holders of stock.287  Both Hedge Funds 
and Institutions sometimes advance their economic interests while 
negatively affecting other shareholders, such as retail investors, holder 
of beneficial interests of Institutional Investors, and any other holders of 
stock.288  This concern is particularly acute when we consider the case of 
Hedge Funds, which have the ability to create unique exposures that 
often create economic interests that are diametrically opposed to those 
of diverse, unaffiliated shareholders and can be opposed to Institutional 
Investors interests, and the interests of their beneficiaries.289  A more 
relaxed takeover regime may also exacerbate Hedge Funds’ and 
Institutions’ short-term biases and negatively affect retail investors, the 
holders of beneficial interests of Institutional Investors and any other 
holders of stock.290  Ultimately, both shareholder conflict and short-term 
                                                                                                                                         
 282. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.A. 
 283. See supra note 94.  But see supra Part IV.A., discussing increased volatility 
resulting from activist strategies. 
 284. See supra note 54.  See generally supra Part II, describing Hedge Funds and 
their investment strategies. 
 285. See supra Part IV. 
 286. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 287. See generally supra Part IV.E., describing intra-shareholder conflicts. 
 288. See generally supra Part IV.E. 
 289. See supra notes 107–22 and accompanying text. 
 290. See generally supra Parts IV.C–D. 
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bias considerations weigh against the case for empowering shareholders 
as a group to decide their fates in the context of mergers because of the 
outsized influence of Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors. 
B. THE AIRGAS COURT REACHED THE RIGHT CONCLUSION 
Delaware courts have expressed skepticism at the idea that 
shareholders’ short-term preferences might outweigh their interests in 
long-term value: in Airgas,291 the court wondered whether there was 
sufficient evidence to suggest that Airgas stockholders were so 
motivated by short-term considerations to “‘take a smaller harvest in the 
swelter of August over a larger one in Indian Summer?”292  In Mercier v. 
Inter-Tel,293 Vice Chancellor Strine similarly expressed skepticism that 
Hedge Funds would accept a lower price in a merger transaction than 
they believed the company to be worth in the proposed alternative 
transactions.294  Strine noted his reluctance to grant an injunction based 
on there being “good” shareholders and “bad short-term” 
shareholders.295  Despite the Chancery Court’s doubts that shareholders 
have disparate economic incentives, in each case,296 the court held that 
the target board’s actions satisfied Unocal’s enhanced standard.297 
Furthermore, since Unocal jurisprudence permits board decision-
making premised upon shareholders’ variable economic incentives, 
Delaware’s takeover regime is thus aligned with empirical evidence 
                                                                                                                                         
 291. 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 292. Id. at 111 (quoting Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. 
Ch. 2007)). 
 293. 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 294. See id. at 815 (“Buttressing an injunction on the notion that these investors 
would take a smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian 
Summer is not something this record supports. Sophisticated short-term traders can reap 
profits from a variety of scenarios.”). 
 295. Id. at 814. 
 296. In Mercier, the court held that the target board acted reasonably and in good 
faith to maximize value for the shareholders, id. at 819, when the board changed the 
record date for an upcoming merger vote, in part to encourage merger arbitrageur 
purchases.  The action was not disproportionate or coercive because shareholders could 
still vote no.  Id. at 816.   
 297. This result is not surprising.  Unocal’s first prong is a deferential 
reasonableness test, see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text, and a board’s 
reliance on a less than certain premise, without more, is insufficient for the first part of 
the test not to be satisfied. 
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demonstrating that not all shareholders are motivated by capturing long-
term value.298  For example, merger arbitrageurs exhibit extremely 
strong short-term biases as the strategy eschews long-term value by 
design.299  Activist Hedge Funds also show mixed effects of short-term 
biases.300  Even Institutions exhibit short-term preferences.301  Most 
importantly, both risk-averse merger arbitrage302 and risk-heavy activist 
strategies303 are incentivized to vote in favor of mergers and lock in 
gains. 
Thus, the Airgas court’s decision to approve maintenance of the 
poison pill in light of the threat posed by short-term investors to other 
shareholders’ interests304 reflects empirical data about shareholders’ 
preferences and incentives, and preserves a target board’s capacity to act 
upon this data.305  Furthermore, preserving the formidable anti-takeover 
effect of existing Unocal jurisprudence is supported by these same 
empirical considerations and any potentially negative consequences of 
relaxing takeover defenses.306 
CONCLUSION 
 This Note establishes that Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors 
generally have different preferences and incentives in takeovers.  
Consequently, this Note concludes that the Airgas court correctly 
determined that Unocal permits a target board to maintain their poison 
pill to protect certain shareholders whose economic interests are 
threatened by Hedge Funds tendering into potentially inadequate bids. 
                                                                                                                                         
 298. See supra Parts II, III, and IV. 
 299. See supra notes 130–31, 133–34, 239 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 130–31, 133–42 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 304. See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 111–12. 
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